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Adult Children and Family Provision Claims in the Supreme Court:  
The Saga Concludes 
 
Dr Heather Conway 
 
Introduction 
In March 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Ilott v The Blue Cross 
and Others1 following a protracted legal dispute which many practitioners (and their 
clients) are all too familiar with. The focus was a family provision claim: an adult 
daughter who had been excluded from her mother’s will alleged a failure to make 
‘reasonable financial provision’ under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975, despite have been both financially independent and estranged 
from her mother for many years. 
 
This is the first time that a case involving the 1975 Act- the template for our own 1979 
Order2- has been reached the highest appellate court in the UK. And while the final 
ruling in Ilott, as in all other family provision claims, turned on the facts of the case, the 
Supreme Court judgment is important for two reasons. First, in overturning the previous 
Court of Appeal decision, it alters the advice to be given to will-makers, prospective 
beneficiaries and those disinherited by a validly executed will.3 Secondly, the judgment 
sets out general principles which will almost certainly influence future family provision 
claims- not just in England and Wales, but in Northern Ireland as well.      
 
 
I. Facts and Appellate History  
 
The facts are well-known. Melita Jackson had been widowed in 1960, while pregnant with 
her only child, Heather. Aged 17, Heather left home to live with- and subsequently 
married- a man her mother disapproved of; this caused a major rift, and mother and 
daughter were never reconciled before Mrs Jackson’s death in 2004. Her final will 
(executed in 2002) left a net estate of £486,000 to three animal charities (The Blue 
Cross, the RSPB and the RSPCA) that she had no lifetime connection to; Mrs Jackson 
made no provision for her only child who was then aged 44, had not worked since the 
birth of the first of her five children in 1983 and was living in a 3-bedroom property 
                                                            
 School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast.  
1 [2017] UKSC 17; [2017] 2 WLR 979. The case was formerly listed as Ilott v Mitson. 
2 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) (NI) Order 1979.  
3 The Court of Appeal judgment (and its consequences) were discussed in H Conway, “Family Provision Claims 
and Adult Children: The Saga Continues…” [2015] 2 Folio: Northern Ireland Conveyancing and Land Law 
Journal 38. 
 
rented from a Housing Association. Heather’s husband worked part-time, and the family 
were dependent on state benefits to meet basic living expenses. 
 
In 2007, District Judge Million ruled that the deceased had not made ‘reasonable 
financial provision’ for her daughter under the 1975 Act, and awarded Heather £50,000 
from the estate. Dissatisfied with the amount, the daughter appealed; however, Eleanor 
King J set aside the decision on the threshold point, citing no failure to make reasonable 
financial provision.4 The daughter then appealed to the Court in Appeal, which ruled in 
her favour in 2011 and remitted her appeal on quantification back to the High Court.5 
Parker J upheld the District Judge’s ruling in March 2014.6 The daughter also appealed 
that decision to the Court of Appeal, which raised the amount to £143,000 with an 
option to draw upon a further £20,0007- effectively tripling the original sum, and 
triggering a final appeal on quantum to the Supreme Court. In a unanimous judgment 
(delivered by Lord Hughes, and with a supplementary judgment from Lady Hale), the 
Supreme Court allowed the appeal, and restored the original award of £50,000.  
 
 
II. Reasons for Allowing the Appeal 
 
The lump sum awarded by the Court of Appeal was to allow the daughter to buy the 
house that she and her family lived in, while the smaller amount was additional income 
intended to supplement her state benefits. In revisiting the District Judge’s award, the 
Court of Appeal claimed that he had committed two fundamental errors of principle. The 
first was in limiting his award to take account of the lengthy estrangement between the 
parties; the second was reaching a figure of £50,000 without considering the impact on 
the daughter’s benefits (the Court of Appeal had structured the smaller payment in a 
way which would not push the daughter’s savings above the £16,000 eligibility threshold 
for Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit which were a key part of the family’s net 
annual income). 
 
Delivering its judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Judge had not erred 
on either point. Having analysed all of the factors listed in s 3 of the 1975 Act,8 the 
District Judge was entitled to view the relationship between mother and daughter and 
their lengthy estrangement as “one of the two dominant factors in this case”9 (the other 
being the daughter’s straitened financial position). The mother’s will had failed to make 
reasonable financial for her daughter, and the District Judge was “perfectly entitled” to 
                                                            
4 [2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam); [2010] 1 FLR 1613. 
5 [2011] EWCA Civ 346; [2012] 2 FLR 170. 
6 [2014] EWHC 542 (Fam); [2015] 1 FLR 291. 
7 [2015] EWCA 797; [2016] 1 All ER 932.  
8 In NI, art 5 of the 1979 Order. 
9 [2017] UKSC 17 at [35].  
conclude that any award “was coloured by the nature of the [parties’] relationship”.10 
Turning to the second suggested error, the District Judge had specifically addressed the 
impact on benefits twice in his judgment, and settled on a figure of £50,000.11 Receipt of 
benefits was a factor for courts to consider;12 having done so, the District Judge was 
entitled to reach a less generous outcome than the Court of Appeal, and had not erred in 
principle.     
 
 
III. The Supreme Court Judgment: Key Points 
 
It is hard to disagree with the Supreme Court’s assessment of the judgment below and 
the reasons for overturning it. However, in reaching this conclusion and looking at the 
operation of the 1975 Act more generally, the Supreme Court judgment makes a 
number of important points which extend beyond the unique factual matrix of this 
particular case, and will almost certainly impact on the equivalent Northern Ireland 
jurisdiction.  
 
 
1. Testamentary Freedom 
 
Melita Jackson had made her reasons for excluding her daughter perfectly clear, 
prompting suggestions that the various rulings- and the second Court of Appeal ruling in 
particular- were ignoring this fact. However, the Supreme Court has now reasserted the 
importance of testamentary freedom in family provision cases involving contested wills. 
This was clear from the opening line of Lord Hughes’ judgment: “English law recognises 
the freedom of individuals to dispose of their assets by will…in whatever manner they 
wish”.13 Later, he criticised the Court of Appeal’s award as giving “little if any weight to 
the quarter century of estrangement or to the testator’s very clear wishes”.14 
 
The fact that greater weight should be given to the deceased’s wishes will be welcomed 
by many. Of course, testamentary freedom is not absolute because it is qualified by the 
1975 Act and the 1979 Order; however, will-makers (and those advising them) should 
be more confident that personal choices will be respected.  
 
                                                            
10 [2017] UKSC 17 at [35].  
11 This sum would allow the daughter to purchase essential household items (she had listed various things that 
she needed to replace), and the money spent on these would minimise the impact on means-tested benefits 
since a large amount of the £50,000 would be spent (leaving savings of less than, or close to, the £16,000 
limit). 
12 The legislation instructs judges to look at an applicant’s “financial resources and financial needs”- 1975 Act, s 
3(1)(a) and 1979 Order, art 5(1)(a).  
13 [2017] UKSC 17 at [1]. In her supplementary judgment, Lady Hale described testamentary freedom as “the 
default position in the law of England and Wales, subject to the courts’ limited discretionary powers”- [2017] 
UKSC 17 at [52].   
14 [2017] UKSC 17 at [46]. 
 2. Conduct and Family Relationships 
 
Conduct has always been a relevant factor in family provision cases,15 even if there are 
relatively few cases in which it has swayed the final outcome. The Supreme Court ruling 
does not alter this: conduct is an important, but not a decisive, factor. And while family 
provision claims should focus on whether or not reasonable financial provision has been 
made for a particular claimant, the reasonableness or otherwise of the testator’s actions 
in excluding a particular individual can be taken into account.16 However, this was not to 
say that a family provision claim should succeed just because the deceased was deemed 
to have acted unreasonably. As Lord Hughes stressed:   
 
[T]he deceased may have acted unreasonably, indeed spitefully, towards a 
claimant, but it may not follow that his [or her] dispositions failed to make 
reasonable financial provision for that claimant...17 
 
What is notable here is that family rifts are relevant, and can result in a particular claim 
being rejected, or in a reduced award (if there has been a failure to make reasonable 
financial provision). This seems instinctively correct: where it exists, estrangement is 
part of the factual matrix and something that courts should take into account; the 
District Judge was entitled to do so in the present case, where the rift was so 
longstanding, and the Court of Appeal did not give this factor sufficient weight. 
 
Again, it is hard to disagree with this approach. However, the Supreme Court did sound 
a note of caution, stressing that awards should not become “rewards for good behaviour 
on the part of the claimant or penalties for bad on the part of the deceased”.18  
 
 
3. Maintenance Means Just That 
 
Surviving spouses and civil partners aside, claims are restricted to ‘maintenance’ though 
the term itself is not defined in the legislation. Previous case law suggests a restrictive 
interpretation,19 something that Lord Hughes affirmed in Ilott (maintenance “cannot 
                                                            
15 Courts are required to look at the “conduct of the applicant or any other person” under s 3(1)(g) of the 1975 
Act and art 5(1)(g) of the 1979 Order. 
16 According to the Supreme Court, this could be factored into conduct under s 3(1)(g) of the 1975 Act (art 
5(1)(g) of the 1979 Order), or perhaps the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities towards the applicant 
under s 3(1)(d) (our art 5(1)(d)). It is more difficult to see how this fits into the latter category. 
17 [2017] UKSC 17 at [17]. 
18 [2017] UKSC 17 at [17]. 
19 See for example, the comments of Browne-Wilkinson J (as he then was) in In Re Dennis (Deceased) [1981] 
2 All ER 140, 146 describing it as “payments which...enable the applicant...to discharge the cost of his daily 
living at whatever standing of living is appropriate to him”.  
extend to any or every thing which it would be desirable for the claimant to have” and 
must “import provision to meet the everyday expenses of living”).20 
 
Of course, the issue here was whether a lump sum of £143,000 to purchase a house 
could be properly described as maintenance, and the clear inference from the Supreme 
Court judgment is that the Court of Appeal had erred in that respect. The statutory 
power was “to provide for maintenance, not to confer capital on the claimant”;21 and 
while provision of housing can constitute maintenance in some cases, their Lordships 
suggested that a life interest would be more appropriate than a capital sum. 
 
So, successful family provisions claims will probably result in much smaller awards than 
those being touted after the Court of Appeal decision in Ilott. The maintenance threshold 
should act as a natural check on any judicial temptation to make an overly generous 
award, and significant legacies or life-changing sums should not be expected.  
 
 
4. Bad News for Adult Children 
 
Family provision claims by adult children have always been notoriously difficult. The 
Court of Appeal ruling was seen as a game changer, given the significant financial award 
to a daughter who had been living independently from, and who had long since ceased 
to have any financial (or emotional tie) to her mother. Expectations now need to be 
tempered: parents are free to disinherit their adult children (though will probably still 
need to set out their reasons for doing so, in the event that a will is challenged).   
 
The Supreme Court judgment does not suggest that independent adult children will 
never succeed; however, the clear inference is that claims by adult children who are 
financially independent from their parents (or, at least, capable of earning their own 
living) will be treated cautiously by courts and can (if successful) expect much less 
generous awards than the one made by the Court of Appeal. In this sense, the Supreme 
Court decision probably returns the law to its pre-Ilott position in England and Wales. 
 
It will be interesting to see how this plays out in Northern Ireland, given that courts here 
have tended to be more generous towards adult children.22 A more restrained approach 
is certainly possible, and future claims might be discouraged- especially where an adult 
son or daughter is ‘comfortably off’ or supporting themselves financially. Being in 
financial need does not guarantee that an award will be made, and the fact that the 
                                                            
20 [2017] UKSC 17 at [14]. 
21 [2017] UKSC 17 at [15].  
22 See for example, Re Creeny [1984] NI 397 and McKernan v McKernan [2007] NICh 6, as well as the 
comments of Horner J in Moffatt v Moffatt [2016] NICh 17 at [19]. 
daughter in Ilott depended on means-tested benefits to meet basic living expenses did 
not significantly strengthen her case. 
 
 
5. Good News for Charities and for Beneficiaries in General 
 
Although the charities were only mentioned briefly in the Supreme Court judgment, what 
was said was important- and changes the advice that might have been given to these 
organisations, and to testators contemplating charitable bequests, in the wake of the 
Court of Appeal ruling.  
 
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s claim that the charities did not have a 
competing need. While their claim was “not on a par” with that of Heather Ilott, charities 
“depend heavily on testamentary bequests for their work... More fundamentally, these 
charities were the chosen beneficiaries of the deceased”.23 The reality, as Lord Hughes 
pointed out, was that an award of £163,000 to Heather Ilott (or any successful litigant) 
“was at the expense of those whom the testator intended to benefit”.24 
 
Charities will welcome the Supreme Court ruling, for obvious reasons. Though heavily 
reliant on public funding in order to survive, in the wake of the Court of Appeal ruling, 
charities were probably less inclined to defend family provision claims where bequests to 
them were subsequently challenged. That is likely to change now, with charities more 
confident of a positive outcome. Testators should probably still list their reasons for 
benefitting a particular charity (especially where the gift is a sizeable one), and a record 
kept in the client’s filenotes. And while the absence of a lifetime connection to a chosen 
charity may raise eyebrows, it will not strengthen the claimant’s hand in a family 
provision claim.25 
 
More generally, when wills are contested under the 1975 Act, nominated beneficiaries do 
not have to justify their selection nor do they have to demonstrate some sort of financial 
need (though, it goes without saying that their needs will be highly relevant in practice); 
the simple fact is that they were chosen by the deceased, in a clear expression of 
testamentary intent. The onus is very much on those making a family provision claim to 
meet the statutory criteria. 
 
                                                            
23 [2017] UKSC 17 at [46].  
24 [2017] UKSC 17 at [46].  
25 Other practical matters to be addressed when dealing with charitable bequests are set out in S Grattan, 
“Charities as Beneficiaries and Elementary Duties” [2017] 1 Folio: Northern Ireland Conveyancing and Land 
Law Journal 19. 
 
IV. Family Provision Claims: Still Unpredictable, But Slightly Less So? 
 
After almost a decade of litigation and six different judgments, the Supreme Court ruling 
in Ilott takes us full circle in upholding the decision of the District Judge. This in itself 
should act as a warning: appeals will only succeed in very limited circumstances. As Lord 
Hughes pointed out, an appellate court “should never [interfere]...simply on the grounds 
that its judge(s) would have been inclined, if sitting at first instance, to have reached a 
different conclusion”.26 The numerous twists and turns in this lengthy appellate saga also 
show that different courts can reach fundamentally different conclusions27 on the same 
set of facts.28 
 
The Supreme Court ruling does not change the law, but it does set out some key points 
of principle which will impact on the advice given to testators, prospective beneficiaries 
and those contemplating family provision claims. Testamentary freedom is not an 
absolute right, but will be given greater weight; maintenance is, by definition, just that; 
chosen beneficiaries do not need to justify their inclusion or establish some sort of 
competing need; and disinherited adult children may find it difficult to succeed, and 
should probably expect more modest awards if they do. Individual outcomes will still be 
difficult to predict in family provision cases- hardly surprising when courts are being 
asked to make value judgments based on “very variable personal and family 
circumstances”.29 However, the judgment does seem to tip the balance in favour of 
those defending the deceased’s will.  
                                                            
26 [2017] UKSC 17 at [24]. 
27 Both on the threshold test (failure to make reasonable financial provision), and the issue of quantum.   
28 In her supplementary judgment, Lady Hale set out three contrasting decisions that the District Judge would 
have been perfectly entitled to make in the present case, namely (i) making no order at all (what Eleanor King 
J decided); (ii) doing what the Court of Appeal effectively did in 2015; or (iii) reaching the decision that he 
reached back in 2007- [2017] UKSC 17 at [65].     
29 [2017] UKSC 17 at [24]. 
